HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS REFINED
1998)

A subject frequently chronicled in this newsletter is the continuing evolution of the law dealing with workplace discrimination claims, especially claims involving sexual harassment. In Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, the California Court of Appeal ruled that evidence of harassment suffered by others is not relevant in a claim of a hostile work environment unless the plaintiff either witnesses incidents of harassment suffered by others or has knowledge about the occurrence of such incidents.

In that case, Beyda, the plaintiff, began work in Los Angeles City Councilman Nate Holden's district office in April 1991. In September 1992, she resigned from her position and promptly filed a claim of sexual harassment and discrimination against Holden and other employees in his office.

During her tenure, Beyda worked in Holden's downtown district office, and on occasion visited Holden's apartment in Marina Del Rey. Beyda alleged that during this time Holden engaged in several acts of unwanted sexual conduct with her and made offensive and explicit sexual remarks in her presence. Additionally, Beyda sought to support her claim for a hostile work environment by introducing evidence that Holden and his staff had engaged in similar conduct with numerous other women. The court granted a defense motion to exclude this evidence. In granting the motion, the court ruled that "such evidence would only be admissible to establish a hostile environment if Beyda was present at the time the incidents occurred."

The court emphasized that while incidents of sexual harassment directed toward other employees in the workplace may be relevant to the evaluation of a hostile work environment, if the plaintiff "neither witnesses the other incidents nor knows that they occurred, those incidents cannot affect his or her perception of the hostility of the work environment." The court reasoned that "the objective severity of harassment must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in plaintiff's position." Consequently, a reasonable person would not perceive a work environment to be objectively hostile or abusive based on conduct toward others of which the person is in fact unaware.

The requisite awareness does not hinge on directly witnessing such acts, however. In fact, the court emphasized that actual observation of such acts was not necessary to show knowledge of the behavior. This is a departure from a previous ruling by the same court in Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, which required a nexus between the allegedly hostile environment and the plaintiff's experience in the workplace. The Beyda court stated that Fisher's "nexus" requirement should not be interpreted so narrowly as to require an "actual" perception of the abusive conduct.

This decision should affect future plaintiffs' claims of a hostile work environment, because in order to introduce evidence of abusive conduct toward other employees, the plaintiff will first have to make the foundational showing that she or he either witnessed the incidents, or knew that they had occurred. Employers, in turn, will have an increased ability to limit intrusive discovery into workplace activities and practices in the context of defending such a claim for a hostile work environment.

The above restriction is limited to those instances where the plaintiff is attempting to introduce direct evidence of sexual harassment against others for the purpose of proving that a hostile work environment existed in regard to him or herself. Evidence of other acts of sexual harassment may be legitimately admissible for other purposes, including impeachment or otherwise attacking the credibility of a witness, establishing a pattern of conduct by the employer, or refuting an employer's defense that a "proper procedure" was followed within the workplace.

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